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Abstract—An increasing amount of mobility data is being
collected every day by different means, e.g., by mobile phone
operators. This data is sometimes published after the applica-
tion of simple anonymization techniques, which might lead to
severe privacy threats. We propose in this paper a new solution
whose novelty is two-fold. Firstly, we introduce an algorithm
designed to hide places where a user stops during her journey
(namely points of interest), by enforcing a constant speed along
her trajectory. Secondly, we leverage places where users meet to
take a chance to swap their trajectories and therefore confuse
an attacker.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The widespread adoption of location-aware devices such
as smartphones has dramatically increased the quantity of
mobility data that is being continuously collected. However,
collecting and sharing mobility data raises serious privacy
concerns. Among the known threats is the extraction of
users’points of interest (POIs) [1], which can be defined
as places where individuals regularly spend some time, e.g.,
home, work, a cinema or a mall. By studying the semantics
of these places, it is possible to infer sensitive knowledge
like religious or political preferences. Learning users’ POIs
can ultimately lead to learn about the real identity of indi-
viduals with a good accuracy. Nevertheless, mobility data
is still very valuable. Publishing such information allows
researchers to perform real-time traffic predictions, find out
interesting patterns or discover social tendencies. It is still an
open and challenging issue to publish mobility traces of a set
of users in a privacy-preserving manner. To reach this objec-
tive, a classical solution that is applied in the literature is to
alter user’s geographical locations (e.g., [2], [3]). However,
this also alters the utility of published data, as trajectories
are heavily distorted. This is why we propose a new solution
for privacy-preserving mobility data publishing that hides
users’ POIs. Our challenge is to minimize the distortion
of the geographical information contained in the published
mobility traces. To reach this objective, our solution distorts
time and opportunistically swap trajectories of users when
it is possible.
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows.
We present related work in Section II, an overview of our
solution in Section III, before concluding in Section IV.
II. RELATED WORK
In 2002, Sweeney introduced the concept of k-anonymity.
The main idea behind it is that, for each quasi-identifier of a
published dataset, there must be at least k persons with this
same quasi-identifier. Abul et al. proposed Wait For Me [3],
which enforces (k, δ)-anonymity for spatial data. Their goal
is to guarantee that at every instant there is at least k users
at a maximum distance δ of the others. Their solution was
shown to perform well with a synthetic dataset but having
more difficulties to maintain a correct utility with a real-life
dataset.
Differential privacy is a more recent concept introduced
by Dwork in 2006. The basic idea is that an aggregate result
over a database should be almost the same whether or not
a single row is present inside the database. Andres et al.
extended differential privacy through the concept of geo-
indistinguishability [2], which is designed to protect location
data. Like differential privacy, its strength is to provide
formal and provable privacy guarantees. However, it is not
yet suitable to protect mobility datasets. We have shown
in [4] that, on a real-life dataset, it does not prevent the
extraction of at least 60 % of the POIs even with a high
privacy level.
Hoh et al. [5] proposed a solution to defeat multi-target
tracking attacks. These attacks are used against mobility
data protected by removing the user identifier to link back
together data that is likely to belong to a same user. The
proposed solution is to force paths of users to cross in
areas where users are close, thus introducing confusion
for an attacker. The solution has only been tested against
randomized movement models.
III. OVERVIEW OF OUR SOLUTION
The first privacy threat we want to address is the extraction
of users’ POIs. These correspond to places where users stop
and spend some time, before moving to another place. A
trace is basically a list of POIs, that can be viewed as
clusters of points (as shown on Fig. 1a), with transitions
in between. To hide users’ POIs, we propose to enforce a
constant speed along the mobility trace of each user. More
specifically, we transform mobility traces to enforce an equal
duration and distance between two consecutive points. If
we can guarantee that speed is constant throughout a trace,
it becomes difficult for an adversary to spot where a user
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Figure 1: An example of two mobility traces anonymized with our solution.
stopped because there is no point at which she appears to
be stationary. Clues can still be obtained from background
knowledge (e.g. the probability is higher to stop in a park
that in the middle of a motorway) but there will be no
certainty for an attacker (e.g. a user can either have just
crossed the park or had a picnic there). Figure 1b shows the
result of this operation applied on two mobility traces. From
this figure, we can see that the POIs of the users have been
hidden and that points on each trace are evenly distributed.
The other privacy threat we want to address in this paper
is the re-identification of users. To reach this objective, we
exploit natural paths crossings to confuse an attacker. When
users move during a day, they continuously meet other users
in public transportations, malls, work places, etc. These
meeting areas are called mix-zones, as introduced in [6].
Mix-zones are well-delimited areas where nobody is tracked;
we only know where and when users enter and leave a mix-
zone, without any insight about what happens inside. Before
users leave a mix-zone, their identifiers are possibly shuffled.
A user entering a mix-zone labelled as "user A" could either
leave it labelled as "user B" or remain "user A". It therefore
helps breaking the correlation between traces before and
after the mix-zone. We do not want to artificially distort
traces to force users to meet, but instead we take advantage
of existing mix-zones. Figure 1c shows that the two traces
have been swapped inside the mix-zone.
Our main utility goal was to minimally distort the loca-
tion. The first step introduces only error when interpolating
new points between known ones. If the sampling rate is
high enough, this interpolation should be precise enough to
introduce almost no spatial inaccuracy. Similarly, the second
step only swap user identifiers but does not alter the location.
The only utility loss comes from the fact we suppress
points inside mix-zones, but this should be a reasonable
degradation as long as mix-zones remain reasonably small.
Tough, we acknowledge not all queries can be implemented
with our solution. For example, studying transitions between
locations cannot be done because users can possibly be
swapped. We believe there is not one solution that fits all
use cases, and that the appropriate solution must be chosen
according to both users’ preferences in terms of privacy and
the analysts’ objectives.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented an overview of a new solution
to anonymize mobility datasets. Its novelty resides in the fact
that it obfuscates time instead of obfuscating location, which
allows to have a better spatial accuracy than state of the
art solutions. Furthermore, our solution swaps trajectories in
order to confuse the attacker, without compromising utility.
We now plan to evaluate our solution with real-life datasets
and study its resiliency against common privacy attacks and
the practical utility it can preserve.
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